The Role Of Simulation In The Test And Evaluation Of A Man In The Loop Weapon System by Henry, Keith Matthew
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses Graduate School
8-2005
The Role Of Simulation In The Test And
Evaluation Of A Man In The Loop Weapon System
Keith Matthew Henry
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information,
please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Henry, Keith Matthew, "The Role Of Simulation In The Test And Evaluation Of A Man In The Loop Weapon System. " Master's
Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2005.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/2001
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Keith Matthew Henry entitled "The Role Of Simulation In
The Test And Evaluation Of A Man In The Loop Weapon System." I have examined the final electronic
copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Aviation Systems.
Frank Collins, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Ted Paludan, George Masters
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
To the Graduate Council:  
 
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Keith Matthew Henry entitled "The Role Of 
Simulation In The Test And Evaluation Of A Man In The Loop Weapon System." I have 
examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend 
that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of 
Science, with a major in Aviation Systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frank Collins           
Major Professor  
 
 
We have read this thesis and 
 recommend its acceptance:  
 
 
 
 
Ted Paludan             
 
 
 
 
George Masters       
Accepted for the Council: 
 
 
 
 Anne Mayhew         
Vice Chancellor and 
Dean of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Original signatures are on file with official student records) 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ROLE OF SIMULATION IN THE TEST AND EVALUATION 
OF A MAN IN THE LOOP WEAPON SYSTEM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis  
Presented for the 
Masters of Science 
Degree 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keith Matthew Henry 
August, 2005 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Department of Defense has attempted to use recent advances in modeling and 
simulation to improve the acquisition process for weapons systems.  This Simulation 
Based Acquisition brought advances in the process, but considerable disagreement 
remains over the universal applicability of this approach.  This paper focuses on the 
challenges of applying modeling and simulation to the Test and Evaluation of a weapon 
system with significant Pilot-Vehicle interface concerns. 
The Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM ER) is an aircraft-
launched missile with GPS/INS guidance for navigation to the target area and Man In 
The Loop (MITL) control in the terminal phase.  The MITL control is conducted through 
a two way video and control data link which transmits infrared video from the missile 
seeker to the control aircraft and guidance update commands from the pilot back to the 
missile.  After initial fielding of the weapon system, two preplanned product 
improvement programs were begun to add both an Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA) 
functionality to aid in pilot target identification as well as a capability to engage moving 
targets at sea (ASuW).  Both Software in the Loop and Hardware in the Loop simulations 
were available for the testing of both these SLAM ER improvements.  This paper focuses 
on the utility of this simulation support in the Test and Evaluation prior to delivery to the 
operational users.  Though the management issues of cost and schedule can be large 
drivers in the use of modeling and simulation, this paper will focus on the performance 
aspect of weapon system evaluation. 
Through the course of both the ATA and ASuW evaluations, simulation was able 
to provide very limited contributions to evaluations of system performance when MITL 
control was a concern.  Simulation was useful in providing data on easily quantifiable 
parameters, such as seeker scan rates.  However, flight tests with a physical prototype 
provided the only effective data when subjective measures such as pilot workload and 
pilot target identification were a concern.  The simulators available did not effectively 
replicate the pilot interface or workload environment to the level required for valid MITL 
data.  Only when an issue with the pilot interface was easily defined in quantifiable 
engineering data was simulation useful in identifying a possible solution – one that had to 
be further evaluated in subsequent flight testing. 
As the quality of models and simulations continue to improve with advances in 
computing, modeling of the pilot vehicle interfaces may improve in the future.  Until that 
time, management controls will be essential to correct application of modeling and 
simulation in areas where MITL is a concern.  The development of models and 
simulations should begin early in the acquisition effort with robust verification and 
validation devoted to the pilot interface.  Early identification of the areas in which 
simulations can contribute to the MITL evaluation effort as well as recognition of the 
limitations of models and simulations.  Finally, the validated simulations should be 
viewed as an enhancement to the evaluation effort with live testing of the physical 
prototype forming the basis of the MITL evaluation, particularly when the system 
approaches the final phases of Developmental Testing and prepares for Operational 
Testing. 
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PREFACE 
 
The presentation of this material, to include analysis, opinions, conclusions and 
recommendations, represents solely the views of the author and is not meant to imply an 
official position of the United States Navy, the Naval Air Systems Command or any of its 
subordinate offices.  This document is intended solely for fulfillment of the author’s 
thesis requirements.  Although the author was the Flight Test Pilot and Project Officer for 
the majority of these evaluations, the testing referenced in this document was conducted 
solely in support of an approved Developmental Test and Evaluation program.  Portions 
of the information contained in this thesis were derived from publications not readily 
available to the public, limited distribution documents.  However, none of the 
information in this thesis is classified.  
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CHAPTER I 
WEAPON DESCRIPTION 
Program History 
 In the mid-1980's a requirement was created for a long range, standoff weapon 
capable of high accuracy.  To fulfill the requirement, one company, hereafter referred to 
as the Contractor, developed a weapon using primarily parts of various currently fielded 
weapons.  The core of the weapon was the Harpoon anti-ship missile.  Using the engine, 
flight controls, warhead and navigation system, the Contractor placed an infrared seeker 
on the front, a data link on the back, and added a GPS receiver.  After updating the 
mission computer software, the missile was fielded as the Standoff Land Attack Missile 
(SLAM).  This weapon allowed the aircrew to remain over 50 nm from a target and hit 
the target with notable accuracy.   
However, after many years of operational experience, a number of shortcomings 
in the system were noted.  SLAM was a very difficult weapon to mission plan.  It was not 
well integrated into the various aircraft which carried it.  The standoff range, though 
notable, was becoming insufficient for some threats fielded in the 1990's.  The infrared 
seeker did not produce video images of a high enough quality for high confidence target 
identification.  And finally, the operator interface was not user friendly. 
To compensate for these shortcomings, a new program was initiated.  This 
program was designed to update the baseline SLAM system in an attempt to eliminate 
most of these shortcomings.  The Contractor retained the infrared seeker and the Harpoon 
engine, but made a number of significant modifications.  The navigation system was 
replaced by a much more accurate system.  The mission computer was updated with an 
improved aircraft interface.  The warhead was totally redesigned.  The data link was 
greatly improved over the SLAM system.  New wings and fins were added for greater 
range and maneuverability.  The new weapon system, called Standoff Land Attack 
Missile Expanded Response (SLAM ER), was successfully fielded in 2000.  Many of the 
shortcomings of the baseline SLAM were overcome by the new SLAM ER. 
Missile Description 
General 
 SLAM ER combines various off the shelf components to provide a highly 
accurate, standoff targeting capability.  A diagram of the various components are shown 
in figure A-1 in the Appendix.  The missile can be launched over 75 nm from the target.  
It will navigate to the target area via a preflight planned mission route.  Once in the target 
area, SLAM ER will transmit IR images of the target back to the launching aircraft, 
normally stationed over 75 nm away.  The pilot in the controlling aircraft can then send 
targeting updates to the missile based upon the infrared seeker images. 
 SLAM ER can be launched in one of three modes: Preplanned (PP), Target of 
Opportunity Land (TOO Land), or Target of Opportunity Anti-Surface Warfare (TOO 
ASuW).  In the PP mode, up to three missions are planned on a mission planning 
computer prior to takeoff.  None of the mission parameters can be modified by the pilot 
after takeoff.  Once launched, the missile will navigate to the target area via the planned 
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route.  In the target area, the missile will radiate infrared video and allow the pilot to 
update the desired aim point.  In the TOO modes, the mission parameters can be modified 
by the pilot after takeoff.  Like PP, the TOO modes are programmed for the missile to 
radiate infrared video in the target area allowing the pilot to update the aim point.  
Designed for use against moving targets, TOO ASuW has the added ability for the pilot 
to provide updates in target position via data link to the missile after launch but before 
seeker video is transmitted.   
Guidance Section 
 The guidance section of the missile consists primarily of the seeker, the 
Guidance/Navigation Unit (GNU) and the Advanced Weapon Data Link (AWDL).  The 
infrared seeker is used in terminal guidance to generate a video scene of the target area.  
Two fields of view, narrow and wide are selectable by the controlling pilot.  The seeker 
internally has the necessary signal processing for target lock-on and tracking once 
commanded by the pilot.  The GNU consists of the Mission Computer (MC), a ring laser 
gyro assembly, an Air Data System and a GPS receiver. All the mission data is stored in 
the MC and is acted upon post launch.  The mission data provides the navigation system 
with necessary information to navigate the missile into the target area prior to the missile 
radiating seeker video.  The Advanced Weapon Data Link (AWDL) provides an RF link 
between the SLAM ER and the control aircraft.  The AWDL transmits seeker video from 
the missile to the control aircraft, and receives post launch Man-In-The-Loop commands 
from the control aircraft.   
 As an aide in training for actual employment, a simulation mode was provided in 
the design of SLAM ER.  In this mode, the missile is flown through a route while loaded 
on the wing of an FA-18.  At the launch point, the pilot carrying the weapon selects an 
option which actives the guidance section but does not release the weapon.  The pilot 
then flies the preplanned route and the weapon will transmit target area video for 
targeting via data link.  The pilot can transmit targeting updates to the missile which are 
reflected by corresponding refinements in the missile seeker pointing.  This simulation 
mode was used extensively during the test and evaluation of the weapon system during 
development in order to reduce the number of missile firings required.  Though it could 
be argued this capability was a contribution of simulation to the Test and Evaluation 
effort, this paper will attempt to focus on simulation used outside of flight testing.  This 
simulation mode of SLAM ER did not reduce the data collection requirements in live 
testing with a physical prototype.  It merely reduced the number of live missile firings 
required.   
Warhead Section 
The warhead/exercise section contains the warhead, planar wings, and the Wing 
Deployment Unit. The planar wings are folded under the missile body during carriage on 
the aircraft.  After launch, the wings are deployed by gas generators within the Wing 
Deployment Unit.  When fully extended, the wings provide improved aerodynamics and 
increased range over the baseline SLAM. 
In some missiles, the warhead is replaced by test electronics.  The section 
contains a telemetry system, a beacon, a flight termination system and an antenna.  These 
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systems are used to monitor various missile parameters real-time and to provide tracking 
and termination capabilities during live fire evolutions in a test environment.  Missiles so 
equipped are labeled exercise missiles. 
Sustainer Section 
The sustainer section, unchanged from Harpoon and baseline SLAM, contains the 
fuel tank and a turbo-fan engine.  As an upgrade over baseline SLAM, the engine speed is 
adjustable by the GNU to further increase SLAM ER's range. 
Control Section 
 The control section contains the control fins and their actuators as well as the 
AWDL antenna.  The control actuators drive the fins based upon signals sent from the 
GNU.  The AWDL antenna is mounted on the control section to optimize the RF path to 
the control aircraft for transmitting video and receiving commands. 
Anti-Surface Warfare 
Background 
 During the original SLAM ER evaluation, some issues were discovered with the 
ASuW mode.  Due to the desire to rapidly deliver the SLAM ER capability to the 
operational Navy, the decision was made to release the missile with PP and TOO Land 
modes, but without a clearance for the ASuW mode.  In the meantime, changes were 
made to the missile software and these modifications were incorporated.  This software 
update also provided ATA capability, for testing purposes only.  This software update 
was designated MCOFS 1.5. 
The Moving Target Problem 
 The significant standoff range which SLAM ER permits created a problem with a 
moving target.  The potential exists that a fast moving target could be outside the seeker 
field of view after an extended flyout against a specific Latitude and Longitude.  To 
rectify this problem, SLAM ER incorporated a method by which the launching aircraft 
could pass updated target coordinates to the missile after launch.  This option required the 
aircraft to have a target tracked via other sensors.  With this track information, the pilot 
could send the updated coordinates to the missile via the AWW-13 Data Link Pod.  Upon 
receiving the new coordinates, the missile would then navigate towards the new 
coordinates.  Called a Course Update, this action could be performed as often or as little 
as the pilot desired during the missile time of flight. 
 Even with the ability to pass real time coordinates to the missile during missile 
flyout, it was believed there still existed the possibility the missile would not be staring 
directly at the target when the seeker video was transmitted in the vicinity of the target.  
For this reason, a second feature was added in the TOO ASuW mode - a scanning seeker.  
When the video was transmitted to the aircraft, the seeker would stare at the target 
coordinates for six seconds and then commence a scan.  The volume of the scan was 
dependent upon a number of factors, including distance from the target and time since 
last Course Update.  The scan would progressively increase in volume until it reached a 
maximum value (in degrees left and right of course line).  Sending a Course Update 
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would reset the scan volume down to a smaller value.  Once the pilot identified the target 
in the seeker video, he could stop the scan and designate the target for more accurate 
terminal guidance. 
Automatic Target Acquisition 
Background 
 Even though SLAM ER provided numerous improvements over baseline SLAM, 
it was still handicapped by the low quality of the infrared seeker video.  The highly 
accurate navigation system coupled with the greatly improved pilot interface masked 
many of the problems with late target identification.  However, an improvement was 
needed.  Rather than take the high risk and costly approach of adding a new seeker, 
another approach was undertaken.  The missile was outfitted with the hardware and 
software required for the missile to attempt to identify the target in the infrared seeker 
field of view.  The capability, called Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA), was intended 
to provide cueing to the pilot to aide in target identification.  The pilot could then use the 
cueing to prosecute the target with increased confidence 
Hardware description 
The hardware and software was an off the shelf solution used in another weapon 
system.  The hardware addition to the missile was called an Automatic Target 
Recognition (ATR) unit.  During mission planning, satellite imagery is downloaded to a 
mission planning system.  The imagery is modified for the specific mission, formatted for 
download to the missile and stored on a memory unit.  After aircraft engine start, the 
imagery is then downloaded from the memory unit to the missile and stored in the ATR 
unit.  After missile launch, the missile navigates to the target via normal means.  Once the 
missile closes on the target and the infrared seeker is operating, the ATR unit attempts to 
obtain a scene match between the seeker video and the stored image.  This was done by 
grabbing frames from the infrared seeker, rotating and scaling both the seeker and 
satellite images, and then attempting to match the two.  Once a match was obtained, the 
information was passed to the GNU for display to the pilot via the data link.  If the pilot 
did not take control of the missile, the SLAM ER mission computer could slew the seeker 
to the target at close range if sufficient thresholds had been met and the match from the 
ATR unit was tagged as high confidence.  For the purposes of this thesis, the term “ATA” 
will be used to refer to both the process and capability described in the above paragraph.  
In the limited instances where this thesis refers to the installed hardware, the term “ATR 
unit” will be used. 
AWW-13 Data Link Pod Description 
 The AWW-13 Data Link Pod is an external pod carried on a weapon station on 
suitably configured aircraft.  It is designed to permit two way data link communications 
with compatible weapons after launch.  The data link permits the reception of video from 
weapons as well as the transmission of control signals to the weapon.  The AWW-13 has 
internal antennas which are used for both the transmission and reception of signals.  In 
addition to the transmitter and receiver hardware, the AWW-13 has an internal video 
recorder for mission recording as well as interface wiring for the carrying aircraft.  The 
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interface wiring permits weapon video to be presented in the cockpit for pilot display as 
well as for receiving command signals from the aircraft for transmission to the weapon. 
 The AWW-13 Data Link Pod could be configured for either autonomous or 
cooperative modes of control for SLAM ER.  In the autonomous mode, the aircraft which 
fired the SLAM ER would also control the missile in the terminal phase.  In this case, 
with the aircraft carrying both a SLAM ER and an AWW-13 Data Link Pod, the pod 
would automatically configure itself to control the missile once the missile was launched.  
As an alternative, the launch and control responsibilities could be split between two 
aircraft.  This second aircraft, carrying an AWW-13 Data Link Pod, used the cooperative 
mode.  The cooperative mode required more extensive cockpit setup than the autonomous 
mode.  However, once a given AWW-13 Data Link Pod was properly configured, the 
signals transmitted to SLAM ER were identical.  This design permitted multiple aircraft 
to be available to control a given missile.  
FA-18 Description 
 The FA-18C Hornet is a single piloted, twin engine, strike fighter aircraft.  The 
aircraft is powered by two General Electric F404 turbofan engines with afterburner.  
Maximum fuel capacity is 16,460 pounds (10,160 pounds internally, and 6,300 pounds in 
a maximum of three external fuel tanks).  The FA-18D, a two seat version flown 
primarily by the U.S. Marine Corps, has identical capabilities as the FA-18C, but carries 
slightly less fuel.  The FA-18C/D can employ both air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons 
including Harpoon, SLAM, and SLAM ER.   
 Tactical displays for the pilot are presented on any of three digital displays. The 
three displays present information in a multi-color format.  The information presented 
can be any combination of raw video or aircraft computer generated symbols.  The 
displays are surrounded by 20 pushbuttons which are used to make selections from 
display driven menus.  Additional tactical controls may be exercised through a variety of 
throttle and control stick mounted switches.  These controls, known as Hands on Throttle 
and Stick (HOTAS), allow the pilot to exercise certain tactical options without releasing 
the aircraft controls.  The options available to either a display push button, control stick 
switch or throttle switch are driven by the specific display presented at the time of switch 
actuation.   A complete description of the FA-18C/D aircraft is contained in the Naval Air 
Training and Operating Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) Manual. 
Any FA-18C/D aircraft configured with the then current Software Configuration 
Set (SCS) 13C or later could be used to support SLAM ER, however, SCS 15C Build 4.2 
or later was required to support ATA.  The test aircraft used in the conduct of the tests 
referenced in this thesis were configured with a variety of additional equipment to 
enhance data collection.  Any one of a number of cockpit video recording systems were 
installed to document the controls and displays presented to the pilot.  All Bus (ALBUS) 
recorders were installed in order to monitor and record computer bus traffic between the 
aircraft avionics systems.  The aircraft were configured with internal beacons or external 
tracking pods for improved ground tracking during flight events.  The test aircraft also 
included RF telemetry of selected aircraft parameters which were monitored real time and 
recorded for subsequent analysis.   
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CHAPTER II 
GOVERNMENT TEST AND EVALUATION 
The Program Manager 
 Overall program management responsibilities for a weapon system rest with the 
Program Manager Aircraft (PMA).  The responsibilities of the PMA cover the full life 
cycle of the weapon system - to include product conception, test and evaluation, 
production, operational Navy delivery, and program termination.  Though the testing of a 
new weapon system is an important part of the life cycle, it represents a small fraction of 
the overall program management concerns for the PMA.   
The Contractor  
 Like the PMA, the Contractor is concerned with and involved in the full life cycle 
of the weapon system.  However, unlike the PMA, a major portion of their effort is 
devoted to the development and testing of the weapon system.  During the product 
development phase, laboratory, ground, and limited flight testing is performed by the 
Contractor.  This testing both satisfies their performance concerns as well as helps in 
meeting the contractual requirements.  The laboratory testing involves component level 
testing and development of the software and hardware using models and simulations.  
The ground testing is limited to emulators which simulate the aircraft interface.  For most 
weapon systems, contractor flight testing is limited to the flying of portions of the 
weapon system on a system test bed, rather than on the actual combat aircraft for which 
the weapon will ultimately be fielded. 
Government Test and Evaluation 
 In an attempt to provide a government evaluation, the PMA contracts out to a 
government Test and Evaluation (T&E) Office to perform laboratory, ground and flight 
testing of new missile systems.  The SLAM T&E Office, based at Naval Air Station 
(NAS) Point Mugu, CA, is responsible for the Developmental Test and Evaluation 
(DT&E) of the Harpoon missile, SLAM, and SLAM ER.  
 A second layer of Government evaluation has been in place since the 1980's.  This 
follow-on phase is known as Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).  Unlike the 
DT&E Office which is funded by the PMA, OT&E is funded and answers to a chain of 
command outside of the T&E community.  This system was designed to provide a more 
independent, final evaluation of a weapon system before it is fully paid for and fielded.  
A second important distinction between Developmental Testing and Operational Testing 
is the pilots involved.  In Developmental Testing, the pilots are Test Pilots to provide the 
necessary engineering background as well as ensure a certain level of safety.  In 
Operational Testing, the pilots are direct from the operational Navy to ensure the system 
is suitable for all pilots.   
During the early phases of DT&E, the government T&E office is intimately 
involved with the engineering and design of a weapon system.  This focus has to shift as 
the system approaches the end of DT&E.  The closer the evaluation is to completion, the 
more the focus must be on the operational utility of the weapon system.  A perfectly 
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engineered system would be useless if it is not operationally useable.  By having this 
operational focus towards the end of an evaluation, the DT&E effort will minimize the 
chances of a failure during OT&E and maximize the chances of the operational Navy 
ending up with a truly enhancing system. 
 Members of the T&E Office may observe testing done by the Contractor during 
the development phase of a weapon.  The degree of T&E Office involvement will vary 
between programs based upon the level of integration between the government and 
contractor teams as well as the product development timeline.  In the case of SLAM ER, 
this observation was relatively limited and did not constitute the official evaluation phase 
for the government team.  Regardless of the level of integration in the early development 
phases, the Contractor will ultimately deliver prototypes to the T&E Office for an 
independent evaluation.  Some initial testing may repeat laboratory testing done by the 
Contractor.  However, the majority of the focus is devoted to ground and flight testing of 
the weapon on the ultimate aircraft.  In many cases, this portion of the weapon 
development is the first time the weapon has fully interfaced with an actual aircraft and 
flown on that aircraft. 
 The degree of the upgrade or modification determines the level of testing required 
in each case.  In the case of both ATA and ASuW, these were upgrades to an already 
proven weapon system.  As such, the focus in the government testing was toward limited 
ground testing to ensure safety of flight items, immediately followed by actual flight 
testing to fully exercise the weapon in an operationally representative environment. 
 The end product of any government weapon system evaluation is at the discretion 
of the PMA.  The end product tends to vary based upon the degree of the modification or 
upgrade.  For the original release of SLAM ER, the SLAM T&E Office produced an 
extensive report detailing all aspects of the evaluation and the weapon system.  This 
reporting requirement was significantly reduced in the case of ATA.  The formal report 
was very limited in scope and focused primarily on the overall effectiveness.  ATA was a 
new capability, but it still represented a relatively minor modification to an existing 
weapon system.  In the case of ASuW, the report was even more limited, in the form of a 
short Naval Message to the PMA.   
Simulation Based Acquisition 
 With the recent improvements in computing power, modeling and simulation 
have developed a more integral role to the defense acquisition process.  This has been a 
continually evolving process within each phase of the acquisition process.  However, 
recent Department of Defense guidance has incorporated a push to ensure that the use of 
modeling and simulation is integrated across all the phases of an acquisition process.  
This emphasis is an effort to ensure that the efforts in modeling and simulation in the 
initial requirements process directly support and grow into the engineering and 
development process.  These efforts should then flow into the T&E process and 
ultimately support fielding and training with the system in the operational Navy. 
 Within the T&E phase, the mindset has historically been one of build, test, fix, 
test.  This process would continue iteratively until a design suitable for operational use 
was produced.  By integrating modeling and simulation into the early phases of 
acquisition and ensuring their growth into the T&E process, the belief is that this 
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historical T&E mindset will change.  STEP is the acronym associated with this mindset 
change and it stands for Simulation Test and Evaluation Process.  With STEP, the past 
T&E process should become one of model, simulate, fix, test, iterate.  This process 
consumes the early part of development and the contractor proceeds to prototype only 
when the model is mature.  This ensures the T&E process is starting with a more 
complete system.   Additionally, the early phases of the T&E process should support 
model and simulation refinement.  This allows the models and simulations to be validated 
to the level that they can be reliably used to support the conclusions T&E is striving for. 
 DOD Directive 5000.2R mandates the use of modeling and simulation throughout 
the life cycle of a weapon system.  Furthermore, it directs modeling and simulation to be 
used as an integral part of T&E.  However, it also directs the use of actual systems or 
meaningful surrogates for OT&E.  A weapon system may not proceed beyond the low 
rate initial production decision based solely on modeling and simulation for OT&E. 
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CHAPTER III 
TEST AND EVALUATION EQUIPMENT 
Ground Test 
 A test facility called the Missile Subsystem Test Set (MSTS) was located at NAS 
Point Mugu.  This was a facility for robust functional test of SLAM ER rounds.  The 
system was built primarily by the Contractor and was supported by them with software 
updates.  The system permitted power up and testing of the subsystems within the 
missiles.  The tests could be run on both full up rounds with live warheads and exercise 
rounds with test packages installed in place of the warhead.  Though each missile 
delivered by the Contractor would be subjected to the MSTS as a first step, this was not 
an integral part of DT&E.  Rather, this was used as a baseline to establish properly 
functioning missiles and to identify possible defective missiles.  The tests conducted by 
this facility could be used to establish reliability data.  However, the interface was not 
robust enough to be viewed as a HWIL level of test equipment to support DT&E. 
 Additionally, SLAM ER specific test boxes were supplied by the Contractor.  
These boxes presented less robust test capability over the MSTS.  They were used 
primarily to support on-site tests for aircraft related events.  These boxes also provided 
limited ability to isolate problems on-site for weapons deployed in the Navy.  Once again, 
these boxes were not used in the T&E process, other than to support reliability data. 
 Since SLAM ER was designed and delivered as an All-Up Round, the 
government T&E facilities for ground testing focused on interfacing with the entire 
missile system, rather than individual components.  As such, the interfaces for ground 
DT&E of the rounds were designed primarily to test and evaluate the aircraft interface.  
In the majority of cases, this involved build-up testing to verify proper aircraft-missile 
interface prior to flight testing.  Simulated aircraft interfaces were available through the 
Advanced Weapons Laboratory at Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS) China Lake.  
These interfaces used a mixture of HWIL and SWIL setups to verify missile responses to 
aircraft signals.  After initial testing in this manner, the missiles would then be connected 
to a physical aircraft.  With ground power applied to the aircraft, the missile could be 
powered up and have numerous tests conducted on it. These tests focused primarily on 
proper aircraft interface, but limited testing of missile performance was also be 
conducted.  These data points were primarily preflight checks and limited investigation 
into missile responses to cockpit switch actuations.  
Flight Test 
 SLAM ER rounds used in T&E were primarily of the exercise configuration.  
Presenting more than just an additional safety layer, the exercise configurations permitted 
much higher volumes of data to be produced.  The telemetry system in the exercise 
rounds monitored and transmitted a significant number of missile parameters.  This 
telemetry could be monitored on both ground testing and airborne testing.  Key telemetry 
parameters could be monitored real time to ensure validity of test data.  In some cases, 
this permitted critical testing to be repeated immediately if a parameter of interest was out 
of the desirable range.  All telemetry from test events was recorded for later analysis.  
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This permitted closer scrutiny on a higher volume of missile parameters than is possible 
real time with limited personnel in the monitoring rooms. 
 Though standard FA-18 configurations would have provided acceptable test 
vehicles, heavily instrumented FA-18s were typically used during the course of the 
evaluation.  The instrumented FA-18s permitted monitoring of a significant number of 
aircraft parameters.  For the purposes of SLAM ER testing, the FA-18 parameters were 
normally constrained to only those aircraft parameters having a direct effect on SLAM 
ER performance.  Portions of this aircraft data were monitored real time while the bulk of 
the data was recorded for later analysis. 
 The majority of the testing utilized ground targets located in the vicinity of 
NAWS China Lake as well as ground and sea targets off NAS Point Mugu.  Targets on 
these ranges presented reasonable surrogates for the tactical targets for which SLAM ER 
was designed.  The targets were typically mock ups constructed to a level of fidelity that 
satisfied the test objectives.  Use of targets on these two ranges also permitted the use of 
the real time telemetry monitoring of both missile and aircraft parameters using the 
ground support in place. 
Government Simulation Capabilities 
By the time of the ASuW evaluation and the ATA evaluation on SLAM ER, the 
weapon system had progressed through a number of years of engineering and 
development.  This process had been accompanied by the development of a variety of 
simulation capabilities.  The majority of these simulation capabilities were conceived to 
evolve with the missile throughout the development process.  These simulation 
capabilities provided significant insight into the missile early in its development as well 
as contributing to the data set during early testing with All-Up Rounds, both on the 
ground and in flight. 
Government SLAM ER simulation capability existed at both NAS Point Mugu 
and NAWS China Lake.  The two simulation capabilities utilized some similar 
components, but the utility of the two systems was totally different.  The system at NAS 
Point Mugu was a software-only simulation used for low level verification of guidance 
section functionality inside a computer-generated simulation environment.  The system at 
NAWS China Lake used the same software, but incorporated it into a Hardware In the 
Loop (HWIL) system.  This system was used for more robust testing of the SLAM ER 
system as an adjunct to flight testing, rather than in direct support. 
NAS Point Mugu 
Hardware 
 The simulation capability at NAS Point Mugu was a 6 Degree of Freedom (DOF) 
software simulation supplied by the Contractor.  This simulation was titled the Air 
Vehicle Performance Simulation (AVPSIM).  AVPSIM provided a performance analysis 
simulation capability for testing the actions and responses of the MCOFS to a variety of 
programmable stimuli.  In order to ensure maximum fidelity, AVPSIM used the actual 
MCOFS software, as coded in ADA.  Interface environments were programmed in 
Fortran.  The device and utilities were programmed in C. The software was hosted on 
Sun computers running a Unix environment. 
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The Mission Computer is at the center of the SLAM ER system.  The Mission 
Computer is responsible for interfacing with, and in many cases controlling, items such 
as flight controls, engine control, seeker, GPS, Air Data System, warhead control and 
AWDL.  For this reason, the focus of the simulation at Point Mugu was the SLAM ER 
Mission Computer.  This permitted investigations into the functioning of a wide range of 
missile performance items. 
System Advantages 
 The primary advantage of the SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation was the relatively 
simple setup.  It had a relatively simple operating environment and required minimal 
support personnel.  The rapid setup and run times permitted large volumes of valid data 
to be produced.   
The SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation was also co-located with the DT&E office for 
SLAM ER.  This decreased the turnaround time when an item in question was tagged for 
simulation investigation. 
System Limitations 
 The SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation was heavily reliant upon Contractor products.  
The SLAM ER software as well as some of the environment software was supplied by 
the Contractor.  This placed limitations upon the growth capability of the simulation.   
The SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation was a low fidelity simulation.  It accurately 
modeled and simulated the MCOFS environment.  However, it provided limited insight 
into hardware issues and into software performance from subsystems outside of the 
mission computers. 
NAWS China Lake 
 The SLAM ER simulation capability at NAWS China Lake was maintained by 
the Missile Simulation Section in support of the SLAM Office NAWS China Lake.  This 
simulation setup was designed to provide insight into a larger range of environments 
from the actual flight tests.  This relationship accurately reflected the purpose of this 
simulation capability - to complement rather than directly support flight testing.  The 
simulation test objectives were generally created separately from flight test objectives.  
This allowed greater autonomy in pursuing areas of advertised SLAM ER capabilities 
which flight test could not or would not test. 
Hardware 
 The SLAM ER simulation setup at NAWS China Lake was a Hardware in the 
Loop (HWIL) simulation and was referred to as the Software Validation Station (SVS) 
Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA) simulation.  A block diagram of the set up is shown 
in figure A-2. 
Software Validation Station 
 The heart of the setup was the SVS.  The SVS was a legacy setup which was 
modified from a simulation capability used in testing the original baseline SLAM missile 
in the late 1980's.  This system was then modified and used to test the non-ATA SLAM 
ER missile in the late 1990's.  The SVS uses the same 6 DOF simulation used at NAS 
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Point Mugu.  However, in the SVS, the GNU and ATA software modules were removed.  
Both were functionally replaced by the actual hardware.  Figure A-2 depicts the ATR unit 
as external to the SVS for clarity (the original SLAM ER SVS used in the late 1990's did 
not contain an ATR unit).  Both the GNU and the ATR unit were loaded with and ran the 
latest Contractor released versions of the respective software load.   
Seeker Interface 
 The SVS ATA simulation used a physical SLAM ER seeker mounted on a 3 axis 
Carco Flight Table.  The use of a physical seeker allowed for maximum fidelity in the 
simulation by maximizing the HWIL.  The seeker outputs were fed directly to the GNU 
and the ATR unit just as they would be in the actual missile. 
IR Scene Generation 
 IR scenes were dynamically projected to the seeker.  The scenes were rendered by 
a Silicon Graphics Onyx2 Infinite Reality Scene Rendering Computer.  The scenes were 
rendered based upon position, velocity, and time information fed from the SVS.  The 
results were fed to Computer Science Applications (CSA) electronics which created the 
timing and video signals necessary to drive the 512x512 WISP resistive array.  The 
output of this array was passed through a collimator to present a 2D scene to the seeker 
with the correct wavelength, look angle, and position relative to the target. 
GPS Simulator 
 The GPS simulator was used to stimulate the SVS as if it were receiving actual 
GPS signals.  GPS ephemeris data was used to derive the viewable constellation based 
upon SVS position, velocity, and time information.  This information was then used to 
create RF signals which were fed directly into the GPS antenna ports on the GNU.  The 
GNU then reacted to those signals as if it were actually flying a route. 
System Advantages 
 This simulation capability presented a robust HWIL testing capability.  Using 
many of the physical subsystems from the missile with minimal emulation required, 
system performance was more confidently modeled than in the SLAM ER 6 DOF 
simulation.   
Verification and validation of the IR scene models presented was initially 
dependent upon flight testing with an actual SLAM ER.  Once this was completed, the 
SVS ATA simulation was able to investigate system reaction to those scenes through a 
much wider range of conditions than was available on a limited flight test schedule. 
The SVS ATA simulation was built and maintained by government workers.  The 
SLAM ER hardware and the respective software were Contractor produced.  However, 
the entire setup was much more responsive to changes dictated by the direction of DT&E 
than was the SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation. 
System Limitations 
The test setup and maintenance were considerably more man-hour intensive than 
the SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation.  It was never a foregone conclusion that an 
investigation of a specific data point was either quicker or cheaper than actual flight test.  
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However, the independent nature of the SVS ATA simulation did allow data to be created 
concurrently with the flight test schedule, thus improving the overall quantity of data 
points. 
The infrared scene models used to stimulate the seeker were not easily produced.  
There was considerable overhead and lead time required to model any desired scene.  
Once available, the scene then required validation in connection with flight test data.  As 
a result of this significant restriction, the SVS ATA simulation was able to contribute 
data on a very limited number of potential targets, all of which had been investigated 
partially through flight testing. 
The quality of the resistive array used to directly stimulate the infrared seeker 
presented an additional modeling concern.  This limitation was primarily driven by 
budgetary constraints forcing the use of less than perfect arrays.  Given the low resolution 
of the infrared seeker on SLAM ER, this appeared to have negligible effect on the ATA 
functioning.  However, it did present a significant issue with the universal acceptance of 
the results of SVS ATA simulation runs. 
Unlike the SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation, the SVS ATA simulation was not co-
located with the SLAM ER DT&E office.  This contributed to the conclusion to create 
separate test objectives for the test and evaluation.  It also increased the turnaround time 
required to investigate a given test item. 
Though the HWIL simulation presented a robust test environment for the SLAM 
ER subsystems, there was no pilot-vehicle interface available.  FA-18 cockpit mockups 
were available at NAWS China Lake, but a decision was made to limit the integration 
effort on the SVS ATA simulation.  This served to decrease the time required to develop 
the SVS ATA simulation.  But it also restricted its utility, particularly in the latter stages 
of DT&E, when operational testing objectives were at the forefront and Human Factors a 
significant area of investigation. 
Contractor Simulation Capabilities 
 The contractor had a variety of simulation levels available for their use.  The 
simulations varied from very basic code development simulations up to a robust, HWIL 
simulation.  These simulations were used by the Contractor in the development of the 
SLAM ER system.  In particular, the Contractor simulation capabilities supported the 
conduct of formal tests to validate software performance and adequacy prior to releasing 
the software to the Navy. This development testing was complemented by a missile 
mockup flown on a King Air aircraft.  However, the Contractor did not have the organic 
ability to flight test a physical SLAM ER on an FA-18.  Thus, the Contractor relied 
heavily upon simulation as their primary means of system development. 
The most robust Contractor simulation setup was very similar to the SVS ATA 
simulation and incorporated many identical hardware and software components.  One 
significant difference between the two simulations was the transmission of video scenes 
to the GNU and ATR unit.  While the SVS ATA simulation used an actual infrared 
seeker, the Contractor chose to inject infrared images from the scene generation computer 
directly into the GNU and ATR unit.   This difference meant that SVS ATA simulation 
presented a more realistic test of the stand-alone missile system.  A second significant 
difference was the ability to perform MITL actions while the simulation was conducting 
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a run.  Both the SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation and the SVS ATA simulation accepted 
MITL commands, but they had to be programmed prior to the initiation of the run.  
Conversely, the Contractor incorporated a rudimentary cockpit mockup with a screen 
projecting the real time IR scenes generated by the scene rendering computer.  This 
presented the opportunity to solicit limited aircrew feedback prior to actual flight test.   
Though government personnel frequently observed simulation tests done by the 
Contractor, these tests generally did not contribute directly to the government testing of 
the end item.  The simulation capability at the Contractor was viewed as proprietary and 
independent of the government conducted evaluation of the SLAM ER system.  
However, this simulation was frequently used by the Contractor while troubleshooting 
issues which arose during government flight testing - problems which could not be 
immediately resolved. 
The utility of the Contractor simulation was also restricted in its remoteness from 
the SLAM ER DT&E office.  Turnaround time was significant, particularly in cases 
where aircrew involvement was deemed necessary. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SIMULATION IN THE ASUW EVALUATION 
ASuW Evaluation Purpose 
 The basic missile configuration that completed developmental testing and entered 
the Navy for operational use contained the software functionality for ASuW.  However, 
specific clearance for operational use of ASuW was restricted until completion of testing 
on this mode.  Such a release with an operational restriction expedited the baseline 
capabilities to the deployed Navy while reducing the schedule constraints of the T&E 
process.  The specific testing of the ASuW capability was designated DT-IIC.  As stated 
in the Flight Test Plan for SLAM ER MCOFS 1.5 ASuW Enhancements: 
 
“The primary purpose of this test is to gather sufficient data to evaluate the ASuW 
mode of the SLAM ER weapon system to determine readiness for Fleet use.  A secondary 
purpose is to obtain a preliminary look at ATA to identify any potential problems prior to 
commencing DT IIID.”3
 
Once sufficient data was gathered to confirm the proper functionality of the 
ASuW mode and a missile firing was conducted, the software would be certified for use 
in the operational Navy. 
Scope Of Test 
 This test phase was planned to be a limited scope evaluation over the course of 
five to eight captive carry flights followed by one live missile firing.  The missile 
configuration had been thoroughly tested prior to release to the operational Navy and the 
ASuW mode had been functionally tested as part of that evaluation. This test phase was 
planned to focus on ASuW objectives and retest only selected objectives of the original 
set to ensure backward compatibility of SLAM ER performance.  The testing was 
envisioned to primarily take an operational look at the ASuW mode and determine if it 
was suitable for the average pilot to employ properly.  The testing was envisioned to 
focus heavily on live testing with a physical prototype flown on an FA-18 aircraft against 
target ships.  This mode of testing was known as captive carry testing, denoting that the 
missile was carried on the aircraft with no intention of being launched.  Simulation had 
contributed heavily to the original evaluation of this software, DT-IIA, and was 
envisioned to have only a limited role in this brief revisit of the software. 
Method Of Test 
The captive carry testing was normally conducted with two FA-18 aircraft, each 
loaded with a SLAM ER and an AWW-13 Data Link Pod.  Each aircraft had missions 
loaded into the missile after engine start.  However, the ASuW mode was a Target of 
Opportunity (TOO) mode, meaning that the mission data normally had to be entered by 
the pilot during the airborne portion of the mission.  After health testing of the missile on 
deck via telemetry, the aircraft would take off and proceed to the test area.  Testing was 
normally conducted cooperatively.   
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Since the primary focus in this test phase was to evaluate the usability of this 
mode, cooperative testing was the preferred arrangement.  Due to the artificiality of 
captive carry, flying a close approximation of an actual missile profile against a moving 
target normally precluded autonomous control of the missile during that profile.  The 
second aircraft, the control aircraft, provided targeting and control of the missile under 
more realistic stand off ranges and without the artificial workload conditions involved in 
captive carry.   
Being a TOO mode, the pilots had much more flexibility in launch point.  Once a 
launch point was agreed upon and both aircraft were in position, the missile aircraft 
would place the missile into the simulation mode and commence a profile towards the 
target.  The control aircraft would use one of a variety of targeting sensors to maintain a 
track on the target.  This track information was periodically sent to the missile to update 
the target location towards which the missile was flying. Approaching the target, the 
SLAM ER would transmit target area video to the control aircraft.  The control aircraft 
would then attempt to find the target in the seeker video.  Unlike the ATA evaluation 
where the missile was flying directly towards a fixed point, in the ASuW mode the 
missile was merely flying towards the general area of the target.  The pilot of the control 
aircraft was responsible for designating the target in the seeker video which would then 
provide guidance commands accurate enough to hit a moving target.   
As part of this terminal control, the pilot would note ranges at which he achieved 
target acquisition.  On all runs, the pilot of the control aircraft was also asked to note the 
spare mental capacity available during the task of designating the target in the seeker 
field of view.  The pilots used the Bedford Workload Rating scale at the completion of 
each run in an attempt to consistently quantify their subjective assessment of workload.  
This permitted evaluation of the ASuW functionality in the context of realistic 
workloads.  Additionally, as part the debriefing evolution for each flight, general pilot 
comments were noted as well in order to try to ascertain pilot reaction to the targeting 
evolution for each run.  A variety of pilots were used in the control aircraft to maximize 
the qualitative comments.  A sample data card is shown in figure A-3. The Bedford 
Workload Rating referenced on the card is shown in figure A-4.  Occasionally, aircraft 
problems or other conditions forced the runs to be conducted autonomously.  The system 
could be operated end to end with only one aircraft.  However, these runs were used 
primarily to check missile functionality, as the Bedford Workload Ratings indicated the 
non-representative condition of flying the missile and controlling it in the ASuW mode.  
The captive carry altitudes and dive angles used by the FA-18 aircraft did closely match 
those that were expected to be experienced by the missile during an actual firing. 
The captive carry tests would be conducted against any targets which could be 
scheduled within the constraints of range and aircraft availability.  A variety of targets 
were available, but each had its advantages and disadvantages.  The NAWC WD target 
ship could be easily scheduled and presented a suitable sized target, but the slow speed 
limited the useful data points.  USCG patrol craft were relatively easily scheduled and 
could achieve high speeds, but their small size presented restrictions on the volume of 
target identification data.  USN warships could provide a suitable target presentation at a 
variety of speeds, but higher priority commitments made the scheduling of test events 
very difficult.  
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Pilot Workload 
  Since SLAM ER had already achieved Initial Operational Capability and had 
proven its technical functioning in the DT&E process, a significant portion of the ASuW 
testing evolution was concerned with the MITL interaction of the system.  This reflected 
the operational focus necessary as the capability was about to be cleared for use in the 
operational Navy.  These concerns with Human Factors are shown in table A-1.  The data 
areas shown are general areas within which each datum was to be further broken down if 
problems should be identified. 
When the evaluation of the ASuW mode began, it became quickly apparent there 
was a significant problem with overall pilot workload.  The workload required to effect a 
hit on a moving target was significantly higher than for hitting a fixed target, as seen in 
the original SLAM ER DT&E and the preliminary ATA evaluation.  The multitude of 
pilot steps required made effective target prosecution very difficult.  The pilot had to 
ensure proper video and data link with the missile.  He had to maintain an accurate 
aircraft sensor track on the target. This track information had to be periodically sent to the 
missile via a data link Course Update command in order to ensure that the missile was 
flying near the target.  When the missile began transmitting video, the pilot had to acquire 
the target, stop the seeker scan and provide a missile seeker designation on the target.  
This designation then had to be updated periodically up to the point of impact. 
An unexpected area of high workload on the early captive carry flights turned out 
to be attempting to stop seeker scan.  In other modes of SLAM ER, target prosecution 
was relatively straightforward.  The pilot merely had to stare at the display while SLAM 
ER flew directly at the target.  With good target coordinates, the target would eventually 
come into view in the seeker and require minor updates to the designation within the 
seeker field of view.  With ASuW however, the target was moving.  In order to maximize 
the chances of finding a moving target from potentially time-late coordinates, the seeker 
was set to scan across the area where the target was estimated to be.  Once the target was 
identified by the pilot, the seeker scan had to then be stopped before the target could be 
designated in the seeker.  Due to recognition time, data link transmission delays and a 
relatively high rate of seeker scan, the seeker rarely stopped with the target in the seeker 
FOV.  Thus, the pilot then had to slew the seeker back towards the target prior to 
designating the target.  This frequently required numerous updates to the designation as 
the seeker field of view was progressively moved back to the target.  These steps 
necessary to fix the seeker on the target consumed valuable terminal control time and 
often resulted in reduced accuracy or occasional misses. 
Initial discussions with the PMA and the Contractor indicated major changes to 
the seeker mechanization in ASuW were unlikely.  The timing of the discovery of this 
issue was out of sync with the planned software updates for ATA.  Minor software 
changes might be entertained, but no minor changes could be quickly identified.  
Additionally, there was considerable unease at removing the scanning functionality in 
ASuW.  Though aircraft navigational system accuracy and targeting system precisions 
had increased in recent years, it was felt there was an unacceptable probability that a 
target could be outside the seeker field of view if it were not scanning against a moving 
target. 
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With this guidance in mind, the problem was discussed among the pilots and 
DT&E team.  After reviewing the pilot comments from the captive carry missions, it was 
decided the most objectionable portion of the designation problem was the high seeker 
scan rate.  The pilots were relatively comfortable with the switch actuations required to 
stop the scan and to move the seeker onto the target.  The problem was that the seeker 
was scanning too fast for the time required for the switch actuations. 
After a thorough review of the factors affecting seeker scan rate, a possible 
solution which did not require missile software changes was quickly identified.  One of 
the parameters which contributed to the extent of the scan was a value called Target 
Uncertainty.  This value was set to a default unless modified by the pilot prior to missile 
launch.  The value, read in feet, was a measure of the targeting error expected with the 
given aircraft sensor utilized.  The default value in the preflight mission planning 
software was set to the maximum value acceptable by the missile.  This value was not 
unreasonable based upon earlier FA-18 radar software capabilities as well as 
uncertainties in older FA-18 navigation systems.  Newer FA-18 radar software produced 
targeting improvements which would allow the pilot to confidently reduce the size of this 
uncertainty value.  The confidence in reducing the value was further enhanced by the 
recent proliferation of GPS hardware into the deployed FA-18 navigation systems. 
Since the time to complete one seeker scan was a set value, it was believed a 
decreased scan extent should equate to a slower scan rate.  This slower scan rate would 
provide the pilot with more reaction time for identifying the target and stopping the 
seeker scan prior to the target passing out of the seeker field of view.  The end result 
should be a decrease in pilot workload with an accompanying increase in terminal 
accuracy. 
Unfortunately, the ASuW evaluation was to be conducted on a limited budget - 
part of which had already been spent arriving at this problem statement.  In addition, sea 
based target availability (USN warships, USGS ships, etc.) continued to restrict the 
evaluation.  A decision needed to be made on whether this solution may be acceptable or 
whether a MCOFS change would be required. 
Simulation Contribution 
 The ASuW mode was extremely MITL intensive.  None of the available 
government simulations could provide the interface necessary to evaluate the MITL 
interaction.  The SVS ATA simulation was extremely limited in the IR scene modeling 
and was not designed to evaluate moving targets.   The SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation had 
no pilot interface displays.  Control inputs to the missile were provided by a 
preprogrammed computer interface.  Furthermore, neither of the simulations fed 
information to a flight representative environment, such as a cockpit mock up.  Any data 
from the simulations were quantitative, dealing primarily with hardware and software 
performance.  This is not to say simulation had not been used during the design and 
development of the pilot interfaces for ASuW.  Extensive use of FA-18 cockpit 
simulators at both the contractor and at NAWS China Lake had provided qualitative data 
on the interface.  However, both of these simulators were driven by a computer model of 
SLAM ER’s performance. This provided sufficient data for adequate design of the 
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controls and displays. However, these computer models represented optimum system 
performance and could not be easily tailored. 
At this point in the development of SLAM ER, the focus was on operation and 
performance of the system.  This required the bringing together of all the pieces in action, 
to include pilot performance in a representative environment.  Through the live, prototype 
testing conducted to date, the pilot interface problem was reasonably understood.  More 
importantly, this specific problem area was easily reduced to a quantifiable parameter – 
seeker scan rate.  Additionally, sufficient flight test data was available as a starting point 
for the investigation. 
 The SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation located at NAS Point Mugu was the focal point 
for investigation of this problem area.  Multiple simulation runs were conducted with the 
Target Certainty varied between runs.  These simulation runs were conducted in minimal 
time and with little additional cost.  Since the problem had been reduced to a specific 
parameter, the simulation runs produced high quality data.  Initial simulation runs were 
conducted with a wide range of Target Certainty values.  Brief qualitative reviews of the 
results indicated four values were suitable for repeated runs and further evaluation.  
Figure A-5 and figure A-6 are outputs from the SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation for a 
representative run.  Figure A-5 represents the entire terminal phase while figure A-6 
shows only the first full seeker scan.  6250 ft represents the default value.  This produced 
a scan extent of 5.3 degrees, which led to the high scan rates seen during flight testing.  
2000 ft, 1000 ft, and 500 ft represented values which were investigated as potential 
alternatives to the default value.  As seen in figure A-6, 2000 ft produced a scan extent of 
2.7 degrees.  This reduced scan extent yielded a scan rate half the objectionable value 
experienced during flight testing. 
Other factors had to be accounted for before considering it acceptable to reduce 
the Target Uncertainty value.  It had to be proven to a reasonable degree of probability 
that the moving target would not be outside this reduced scan extent.  The major items to 
consider were accuracy of Midcourse Updates, target speed and time since last update. 
The comprehensive flight test data from the previous ASuW captive carry missions 
provided the basis for evaluating the targeting accuracy. The SLAM ER Operational 
Requirements Document provided the acceptable values for target speed and established 
a theoretical maximum value.  Time since last target position update had to include the 
potential worst case.  Setting this value to missile launch (i.e. no target position updates 
via data link) represented the worst case.  Once again, the SLAM ER Operational 
Requirements Document provided a launch range suitable for this investigation.  With 
these values in hand, it then became a relatively simple time-distance-heading problem to 
ensure the target would remain within this reduced scan extent. 
Since the pilot interface was not accurately modeled in the SLAM ER 6 DOF 
simulation, an acceptable scan rate could not be positively identified.   However, rough 
qualitative judgments could be made based upon the problems observed in flight.  The 
switch actuations required to stop the scan and reposition the seeker on the target were 
well quantified in the previous tests.  Given the fixed value for the SLAM ER seeker field 
of view, the scan rates were readily converted into times that the target might potentially 
be visible in the seeker.  Comparing these times, a small range of Target Uncertainty 
values were identified as a possible solution.   
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Since this pilot interface problem focused on the MITL control and no suitable 
simulation was available, the proposed values for Target Certainty would have to be 
evaluated during live testing with the physical prototype.  Runs were conducted on the 
ensuing test events with the values of Target Certainty varied between runs.  The default, 
maximum value was also used to ensure data relevance to previous testing.  As expected 
from the evaluation of the simulation results, smaller Target Certainty values did 
significantly reduce pilot workloads.  More importantly, the workloads were reduced to a 
level that was considered acceptable by the pilots and, thus, required no aircraft or missile 
software changes to correct the problem.  As a Target of Opportunity mode, the pilot 
would have to modify mission parameters inflight prior to employment.  So, it was not 
considered a significant issue for the pilot to have to modify Target Certainty as well as 
launch point and target information.  The actual value used would depend upon the 
accuracy of the targeting system and the pilot’s confidence in that system.  However, 
values lower than the default of 6250 and larger than the anticipated accuracy of the 
Hornet targeting system were demonstrated to provide positive effects on scan rate.  
Additionally, the mission planning software could be updated in future releases to 
incorporate the lessons learned from this test evolution.  These updates could include a 
change to the default value to better reflect the balance of targeting system accuracies 
versus seeker scan rate. 
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CHAPTER V 
SIMULATION IN THE ATA EVALUATION 
ATA Evaluation Purpose 
 SLAM ER had passed the full rate production decision, known then as Milestone 
III decision.  The configuration of SLAM ER which passed the Milestone III decision did 
not include the ATA functionality.  ATA was considered a preplanned product 
improvement upon the baseline configuration of SLAM ER.  The specific testing of the 
ATA improvement with the associated software was designated DT-IIID.  As stated in 
the Flight Test Plan for SLAM ER ATA Software Suite Version (SSV) 1.6: 
 
“The purpose of this test is to evaluate SLAM ER ATA with SSV 1.6 on the FA-18C/D 
aircraft to determine readiness for Fleet use.  Specifically, testing will be performed to: 
1) Verify retention of non-ATA SLAM ER capabilities, as demonstrated in 
previous test phases, 
2) Verify satisfactory correction of SLAM ER SSV 1.5 deficiencies, 
3) Evaluate ATA as a pilot cueing aide, 
4) Evaluate autonomous mode (no pilot intervention, a.k.a. ATA “only”) of 
ATA operation, 
5) Captive carry testing to evaluate, and prepare for, proposed free-flight 
launch scenarios, and 
6) Gather ATA performance data to support tactics development.”1
Scope Of Test 
  The ATA evaluation was a more comprehensive evaluation than that seen in the 
very limited scope ASuW testing.  The ATA phase of testing was designed to begin with 
ground testing, both simulation and with physical prototypes.  The simulation efforts 
were to be conducted in both the 6DOF and the SVS ATA simulations, concurrently with 
the physical prototype testing.  The physical prototype would be subjected to ground tests 
both in isolation and when loaded on the aircraft.  Once the ground testing had progressed 
satisfactorily, the testing would move to live testing with the physical prototype on an 
airborne aircraft flying against surrogate targets, known as captive carry testing. These 
flights were to utilize the simulated mode of SLAM ER in the approximate profiles seen 
by the missile during an actual launch.  They would be flown against tactically 
representative targets.  This procedure would allow verification of missile performance as 
well as pilot interaction with the terminal targeting system in realistic conditions.  Upon 
successful completion of the captive carry phase, the test would then progress on to a 
series of live missile firings against surrogate targets.  For the purposes of this thesis, the 
relevant data points were reached during the captive carry portion of the testing. 
Though this phase of testing was designed to be a comprehensive evaluation of 
the ATA functionality, limited changes would be possible in response to any anomalies 
detected.  At this point in the acquisition process, SLAM ER was a mature system, 
already in operational use in the Navy.  Additionally, having been implemented as an off 
the shelf solution, the ATR unit was a fixed design.  The DT&E effort viewed the ATR 
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unit as a black box to which no changes were possible.  The SLAM ER mission 
computers did have some effect on the ATR unit interface as well as ATA success and 
limited changes to the mission computer software were possible.  Given these technical 
limitations, this phase of testing assumed much more of an operational evaluation flavor 
than previous DT&E events with SLAM ER. 
 An ideal test and evaluation process would allow for testing under a multitude of 
environmental factors against a variety of targets.  The realities of budgetary and 
schedule limitations prevented this for the flight test portion.  The captive carry testing 
would test against a variety of targets in various environments, but it would not be 
inclusive of all the Navy’s operational environments.  It was hoped that SLAM ER 
simulation capabilities would help in this respect. 
Method Of Test 
 In support of the objective to evaluate ATA as a pilot cueing aide, the testing 
focused primarily on collecting data on the range at which the pilot achieved target 
identification in the seeker video.  This was to be evaluated both aided and unaided by 
ATA on the same or similar targets.  This would permit evaluation of the degree of 
enhancement provided by ATA.  Pilot workload information was collected concurrently.  
The evaluation of pilot detection ranges was normally conducted in parallel with the 
functional evaluation of the ATR unit via telemetry data.  This functional evaluation 
supported both the verification of legacy SLAM ER functionality was well as correction 
of various outstanding system deficiencies.  ATA only functioning of the missile was also 
conducted on selected runs.  Since the critical data point was pilot target identification 
ranges, it was acceptable for the missile to fly to the target without targeting updates from 
the pilot, and thus collect data on ATA while the pilot noted target identification range, 
hands off. 
 The captive carry testing was normally conducted with two FA-18 aircraft, each 
loaded with a SLAM ER and an AWW-13 Data Link Pod.  Each aircraft had up to three 
preplanned missions saved on the FA-18 Memory Unit, which transferred the mission 
data to the missile after aircraft engine start.  After health testing of the missile on deck 
via telemetry, the aircraft would take off and proceed to the test area.  Testing was 
conducted either autonomously or cooperatively between aircraft.   
When conducted autonomously, the primary focus was on evaluating the ATA 
performance independent of pilot input.  The pilots would proceed to the launch point for 
the loaded mission, initiate the simulated flight mode of the missile and then fly the route 
into the target area with a dive attack into the target.  Though SLAM ER can impact a 
target from a variety of vertical impact angles, safety limitations prevented an accurate 
reproduction of these angles during captive carry flight.  The majority of the runs were at 
representative approach altitudes, but unrealistically shallow dive angles.  A limited 
number of runs were conducted from steep dive angles, albeit with artificially high 
approach altitudes to start these dives.  Multiple runs would be conducted on each flight.   
When testing was conducted cooperatively, the primary focus was on evaluating 
ATA cueing as an aide to pilot target acquisition.  One aircraft would orbit a significant 
distance out the extended attack axis monitoring the cockpit data link display.  This 
aircraft was known as the control aircraft.  Meanwhile, the aircraft carrying the missile 
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flew a reprsentative attack profile.  In the target area, the SLAM ER would transmit 
target area video to the control aircraft.  The control aircraft would then control the 
missile, updating the target designation as required.  As part of this control evolution, the 
pilot would note ranges at which he achieved target acquisition.  Runs were conducted 
both with and without ATA cueing to provide a comparison of the ATA enhancement.  
On all runs, the pilot of the control aircraft was also asked to note the spare mental 
capacity available during the task of acquiring the target in the seeker field of view.  The 
pilots used the Bedford Workload Rating scale at the completion of each run in an 
attempt to consistently quantify their subjective assessment of workload. This permitted 
the ATA enhancement to be viewed in the context of cockpit workload present during 
these targeting evolutions. Additionally, as part of the debriefing evolution for each 
flight, general pilot comments were noted in order to ascertain pilot reaction to the ATA 
performance for each run.  A variety of pilots were used in the control aircraft to vary the 
perspectives for the qualitative comments as well as show consistency in target 
acquisition ranges.  A sample data card is shown as figure A-7.  
Pilot Target Acquisition 
Through both simulation testing and live testing with a physical prototype, early 
indications were the system functioned as anticipated.  A high degree of confidence was 
reached early with respect to the retention of prior SLAM ER capabilities as well as the 
correction of outstanding deficiencies.  Initial ATA runs appeared to show the ATR unit 
functioning properly. 
The focus of the test rapidly progressed towards the next test objectives - evaluate 
ATA as a pilot cueing aide and evaluate the autonomous mode.  These two objectives 
were interrelated.  They depended upon determining a recommended target set for ATA.  
It was accepted that not all SLAM ER targets would necessarily be ATA targets.  The 
requirements of obtaining satellite imagery and manipulating this imagery as part of 
preflight planning were labor intensive tasks which may not be necessary for relatively 
simple target areas.  Within the ATA suitable target sets, data was also desired on how to 
maximize the opportunity for ATA to succeed.  There were numerous variables which 
could enhance or retard the ATA processing, to include fidelity in mission planning, 
missile ingress altitude and approach angle, among others.  The success of the ATA 
processing within the missile was not the final data point. The ATA capability needed to 
increase pilot target acquisition ranges to succeed in the evaluation.  So, the remaining 
test objectives became: in what environments does ATA function well and does it 
improve pilot target acquisition ranges in those environments?  It was not enough for 
ATA to consistently identify the solitary building in an open field if the pilots alone were 
able to consistently acquire the building at tactically significant ranges.  
 An additional concern of the testing evolution was the pilot interface of the 
system.  The primary Human Factors concerns are shown in table A-2.  The data areas 
shown were general areas within which data would be further broken down as necessary 
to verify system performance.  These areas were related to the target acquisition range 
issue.  However, they also represented general pilot interface questions which needed to 
be resolved prior to the weapon system being cleared for operational use. 
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Simulation Contributions 
 The SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation was able to provide a reliable test environment 
for basic ATA functionality.  It was able to evaluate the proper functioning of scripted 
pilot inputs in varying conditions.  This was useful to the overall test program in that it 
considerably reduced the test points required from live, captive carry testing with the 
aircraft. This was particularly useful in relation to regression testing to ensure ATA did 
not degrade other functions in the missile.  By reducing the required number of scripted 
switch actuations in flight, the testing could focus on the question of whether ATA 
worked as a targeting aide.  However, the extremely limited modeling of the pilot 
interface on the SLAM ER 6 DOF simulation severely limited its contribution to the 
central question of ATA compatible target environments and pilot target acquisition in 
those environments. 
The SVS ATA simulation was able to verify proper functioning of the ATR unit 
and its interface with the rest of the missile system.  Since the ATR unit was being 
viewed as a black box, this effort was valuable to the overall test and evaluation.  It 
significantly reduced the data points needed with a physical prototype.   More 
importantly, the SVS ATA simulation held the promise of being able to contribute to the 
question of ATA compatible target environments.  The high fidelity modeling of the 
interaction between the ATR unit and the seeker held the potential to provide extensive 
data on ATR unit performance in a variety of target environments.  This data would 
contribute to identifying those environments where ATA could be expected to succeed.  
Given the limited modeling of the pilot interface, the SVS ATA simulation alone could 
not answer the question of whether pilot target acquisition ranges were increased with 
ATA.  However, if the target environments in which ATA increased target acquisition 
ranges could be generalized, then the SVS ATA simulation could contribute through 
further investigation in those areas than possible through flight test alone. 
The SVS ATA simulation had limitations in predicting ATR unit peformance.  
The primary issue was the effort required to provide a reasonably accurate stimulation for 
the SLAM ER seeker (which then provided an input to the ATR unit).  Hardware issues 
caused by the quality of the resistive arrays providing input to the seeker presented a 
hurdle.  Another problem was the limited number of infrared scene models available for 
use as stimulation.  One target area was thoroughly modeled as an infrared scene and 
validated by an earlier weapons program.  The SLAM ER effort contributed another four 
infrared scene models, though these additional models had limited validation efforts 
conducted.  Within these limited target area models, the SVS ATA simulation was able to 
investigate significant variations in missile flight parameters as well as atmospheric and 
diurnal variations.  This aided the overall evaluation in that it helped identify likely ATR 
unit reactions to subtle changes from a given flight test data point, without additional 
flight testing at that specific new data point.   In particular, it did allow more 
representative dive angles to be used than were possible in captive carry evolutions.  
However, with an inability to develop target area infrared scene models not seen in 
captive carry testing, the SVS ATA simulation did not appreciably increase the 
program’s overall data points. 
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 For a given set of conditions where pilot reaction to the ATA cueing was defined 
from flight test, the SVS ATA simulation could predict how the cueing may vary for 
given changes in conditions.  However, simulation failed to provide useful data on the 
MITL questions.  The simulations were designed with an eye toward hardware and 
software test and evaluation.  Specifically, they were aimed at taking the contractor-
supplied parts (software and hardware) and operating them throughout a wider range of 
test conditions than was possible in flight test.  At this they excelled.  However, the 
rudimentary pilot interface was insufficient to draw reliable conclusions.  ATA was 
designed to aid in pilot target detection.  Though simulations fed to cockpit mockups 
aided in evaluating the design of the interface, evaluation of the utility and effectiveness 
of the system under operationally realistic conditions required live testing with physical 
prototypes.  Being able to put target detection ranges together with an environment that 
produced acceptable pilot workload ratings was essential to the believability of the 
results. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Man In The Loop Simulation 
 DOD Instruction 5000.2R directs PMAs to “identify and fund required M&S 
resources early in the acquisition life cycle, so that M&S may be integrated with the T&E 
program.”5  The SLAM ER program followed this direction in developing a robust 
simulation capability.  The Contractor had developed extensive simulation support with 
varying levels of fidelity.  They had continually improved and evolved these simulations 
through the development phase of the weapon.  On the government side, the SLAM ER 6 
DOF simulation at NAS Point Mugu was a validated SWIL simulation which provided 
extensive data with quick turnaround times.  The SVS ATA simulation at NAWS China 
Lake provided a HWIL simulation, to include the stimulation of a physical missile seeker 
video to provide a high fidelity simulation.  Both the Contractor and the government had 
FA-18 cockpit mockups with low fidelity, computer generated SLAM ER stimulation.  
As the program progressed in the early phases of DT&E, the simulations were essential 
in designing and testing the missile capabilities.  The contributions even included early 
design and limited testing of various portions of the pilot interface.   
In addressing the conduct of Operational Testing, DOD Instruction 5000.2R 
directs, “Whenever possible, an OA shall draw upon test results with the actual system, 
or subsystem, or key components thereof, or with operationally meaningful surrogates.  
When actual testing is not possible to support an OA, such assessments may utilize 
computer modeling and/or hardware in the loop, simulations (preferably with real 
operators in the loop)”.5   It further directs DT&E to look at operational issues by stating, 
“Address the potential of satisfying OT&E requirements to the best extent possible by 
testing in operationally relevant environments (simulated or actual), without jeopardizing 
DT&E objectives, to reduce overall T&E redundancy and costs.”5  It was in attempting to 
satisfy this direction that the SLAM ER program found significantly restricted utility in 
the use of simulations.  A conscious decision was made early in the SLAM ER program 
to develop simulations as a contributor at the engineering level.  However, the modeling 
and simulation of the terminal MITL aspects of the weapon were limited in scope.  In the 
latter stages of T&E, as the DT&E effort became less focused on system development 
and more concerned with operational testing, the limited modeling and simulation of the 
MITL interaction could not support the close scrutiny on the pilot interface.  This 
scrutiny on the MITL portion of the weapon tended to limit the contributions of the 
various simulations in the later stages of DT&E. 
 As seen in the ATA evaluation, the key parameter which could not be tested in the 
simulation was pilot target identification ranges while subjected to mission representative 
work loads.  This parameter focused heavily on pilot decision making with the added 
attention sharing problems of operating the aircraft.  This aspect of the evaluation could 
not be adequately simulated with the facilities available.  The DT&E effort was forced to 
collect data on these parameters exclusively with live testing using a physical prototype 
against surrogate targets.  Simulation was able to increase the total number of data points 
by evaluating ATA only missile performance against infrared scene models.  However, 
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this information was useful only after live testing with a physical prototype had identified 
general target classes and environments where ATA aided the pilot in achieving target 
acquisition. 
 In the ASuW evaluation, simulation was useful in early development of the pilot 
interface.  However, the unacceptably high workload involved in stopping the scan and 
slewing the seeker back onto the target was only identified once the pilot was subjected 
to mission representative workloads during live testing.  Once identified, simulation was 
able to provide value to the refinement of the pilot interface.  With the MITL interface 
problem defined in quantitative, engineering parameters, simulation was used to assist in 
identifying a potential solution.  However, this proposed solution still had to be validated 
in live testing with a physical prototype. 
Recommendations 
 Modeling and simulation contributed significantly to the early development of 
SLAM ER.  Though this effort did significantly improve the development process, it 
reached the limits of its utility while attempting to draw conclusions about the pilot 
interface under operationally representative workloads. Numerous computer advances 
have occurred since the program was begun.  The program also predated the DoD’s 
concept of Simulation Based Acquisition.  The DoD’s STEP approach, with its 
philosophy of model, simulate, fix, test, iterate, should increase the use of models and 
simulations in acquisition programs.  This effort should be embraced.  However, this 
effort should be accompanied by realistic control measures to ensure the efforts fully 
realize the challenges in the development effort for MITL weapon systems. 
If a program elects to develop models and simulations to support conclusions on 
MITL interactions, the model and simulation development must start early in the program 
with a concerted effort on verification and validation of the pilot interface.  With MITL 
weapon systems, it is not enough to think only about the validation of the models and 
simulations from an engineering systems standpoint.  The pilot interface portion of 
models and simulations must be constantly scrutinized and improved throughout the 
engineering development.  With a MITL weapon system, the pilot interface cannot be 
viewed as a limitation to the scope of development of any model or simulation.  Early 
involvement of pilot inputs on the simulation design is crucial.  This involvement must 
focus on the realism of the simulations and not be viewed solely as an objective 
evaluation of the weapon system design.  With this high level of rigor, these models and 
simulations may be able to support DT&E conclusions on MITL issues. 
A point must be identified in the DT&E effort when conclusive data will be 
needed on the pilot interface under realistic workloads.  The program should closely 
scrutinize the cost benefits of a high fidelity MITL model and simulation when compared 
with a less robust simulation effort supported by live testing. The point where conclusive 
pilot interface data is needed will typically come towards the end of the DT&E cycle as 
the program prepares to enter Operational Testing.  However, the more extensive the 
MITL interface, the earlier the program should consider a transition to live testing with a 
physical prototype. If the transition is made too late, workload differences between 
simulations and live flight testing may reveal significant MTIL interface issues late in the 
DT&E process.  Entering Operational Testing based primarily upon simulation data for a 
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weapon system with extensive MITL interface issues should be viewed as a high risk 
decision. 
 
  
 28
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKS CONSULTED 
 29
Bibliography 
1. Henry, Keith and Gilbert Anema, Flight Test Plan - Standoff Land Attack Missile 
Expanded Response (SLAM ER) Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA) Software Suite 
Version (SSV) 1.6, NAWC WD Code 4KEA00E, NAS Point Mugu, Feb 2001. 
2. Harpoon/SLAM Program Office, Code 47HC00D, Standoff Land Attack Missile 
Expanded Response Software Validation Station Automatic Target Acquisition Test Plan, 
NAWC WD, NAWS China Lake, CA, 10 Aug, 2000. 
3. Henry, Keith and Brad Hutson, Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response 
(SLAM ER) Mission Computer Operational Flight Software (MCOFS) 1.5 Anti-Surface 
Warfare (ASuW) Enhancements, NAWC WD Code 4KEA00E, NAS Point Mugu, Apr 
2000. 
4. Roscoe, A.H. and Ellis, G.A., A Subjective Rating Scale for Assessing Pilot Workload 
in Flight: A Decade of Practical Use, Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, UK, 
1990. 
5. Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major 
Automated Information Systems Acquisition Programs (DoD 5000.2R), Washington, 
DC, 5 April, 2002. 
 
 
 
 30
Additional References 
Davis, Paul K. and Robert H. Anderson, Improving the Composability of Department of 
Defense Models and Simulations,  RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2003. 
Defense Systems Management College, Test and Evaluation Management Guide 3d ed., 
Defense Systems Management College Press, Fort Belvoir, VA, 1998. 
Defense Test and Evaluation Professional Institute, Modeling and Simulation: A Short 
Course for the Test and Evaluation Professional, ver 1.0, 14 Nov 2000. 
Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 
DOD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Management (DoD 5000.59), Washington, DC, 
20 January, 1998. 
Harpoon/SLAM Program Office, Code 47HC00D, Standoff Land Attack Missile 
Expanded Response Software Validation Station Automatic Target Acquisition 
Accreditation Plan, NAWC WD, NAWS China Lake, CA, 4 Apr 2000. 
Harpoon/SLAM Program Office, Code 47HC00D, Standoff Land Attack Missile 
Expanded Response Software Validation Station Test Plan, NAWC WD, NAWS China 
Lake, CA, 28 Feb 1997. 
Henry, Keith and Gilbert Anema, Captive Carry Flight Test Plan - Standoff Land Attack 
Missile Expanded Response (SLAM ER) Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA), NAWC 
WD Code 4KEA00E, NAS Point Mugu, Jun 2000. 
Henry, Keith and Gilbert Anema, Captive Carry Flight Test Plan - Standoff Land Attack 
Missile Expanded Response (SLAM ER) Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA) Electro-
Optical Countermeasures (EO CM) Susceptibility, NAWC WD Code 4KEA00E, NAS 
Point Mugu, Sep 2000. 
Johnson, Michael V.R., Mark F. McKeon and Terence R. Szanto, Simulation Based 
Acquisition: A New Approach, Defense Systems Management College Press, Fort 
Belvoir, VA, 1998. 
NATOPS Flight Manual Navy Model FA-18 A/B/C/D A1-F18AC-NFM-000, 15 October 
2003 
Under Secretary for Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), 
Study on the Effectiveness of Modeling and Simulation in the Weapon System 
Acquisition Process, Oct 1996. 
Vanden-Heuvel, Michael and Rebecca Lenz, A Structured Design and Analysis 
Methodology for Guided Weapons Concepts, U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory 
(Munitions Directorate). 
 31
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 32
 Redundant
Flight Termination
Tray
Length    = 172.0 in. 
Diameter    = 13.5 in. 
Weight    = 1,473 lb 
Nominal Characteristics 
Air Data System 
Probe 
Arming Probe
Guidance Section Exercise Section Sustainer Section 
Control
Section
IIR Seeker 
Automatic Target
Recognition Unit
Inlet Cover Start TankBattery
Control Fins 
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Weapon 
Data Link 
Electronic Control Amplifier 
Control Actuators (4) 
Guidance Navigation Unit
Global Positioning System Antennas
Instrumentation Antenna
PCM
Telemetry
Tray
+X 
Safe/Arm Contact Fuze
 
 
Figure A-1. SLAM ER Components.1
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Carco Flight Table
Seeker IR Scene Proj.  Software 
Validation 
   Station 
    (SVS)
    GPS 
Simulator
    Scene 
Generation 
 Computer
Ethernet
ATR
 
 
Figure A-2. SLAM ER SVS ATA Simulation.2
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Run 3 
TEST PARAMETERS
CONTROLLER 
10 nmi trail @ MSIM 
On shot bearing  
5000 ft, .60 IMN 
LP RNG: 25 nmi 
.82 IMN 
SRCH ALT 700 ft 
(carrier flies to CTR  
SKR pointing 
cross)
 MST 
TGT:  Speed 10 
kts 
• Launch Alt: 2000 ft 
• 
• 
Srch Alt: 700 ft 
TGT Uncertainty: 6520 
• CRSUPs 
• 20 nmi 
• 15 nmi 
• 10 nmi 
•   5 nmi if req’d 
• MITL 
• Polarity Hot or as req 
• Stop Scan as desired 
• Cent Trk at 4 nmi 
• SMAU’s < 2.5 nmi 
• Aim Pt: Center of vans 
       below RDR TWR 
Controller Record: 
 
   HDG/ALT @ Radiate:   
 
  ______/______ 
 
   RNG/BRG from Target @ Radiate
 
  ______/______ 
 
   Range @ Target ID:  
 
  _____________ 
 
   RNG/BRG from Target @ Impact: 
 
  ______/______ 
 
   Bedford Workload Rating: 
 
  _____________ 
 
Comments: 
    
Figure A-3. Sample ASuW Kneeboard Card.3
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 PILOT DECISIONS
WAS IT
POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE
THE TASK?
WAS
WORKLOAD TOLERABLE
FOR THE TASK?
WAS WORKLOAD
SATISFACTORY
WITHOUT REDUCTION?
Workload Insignificant. WL 1
Workload Low. WL 2
Enough spare capacity for all desirable additional tasks. WL 3
Insufficient spare capacity for easy attention to
addit ional tasks.
WL 4
Reduced spare capacity:
Additional tasks cannot be given the desired amount of
attention.
WL 5
Little spare capacity:
Level of effort allows litt le attention to addit ional tasks.
WL 6
Very little spare capacity:
But maintenance of effort in the primary tasks not in
question.
WL 7
Very high workload with almost no spare capacity.
Difficulty in maintaining level of effort.
WL 8
Extremely high workload.  No spare capacity.
Serious doubts as to ability to maintain level of effort.
WL 9
Task abandoned.
Pilot unable to apply sufficient effort.
WL 10
WORKLOAD DESCRIPTION RATING
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
 
 
Figure A-4. Bedford Workload Rating.4
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Table A-1. ASuW Test Objectives for Human Factors.3
CAPTIVE CARRY FF 
 
 
OBJECTIVES  
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t 7
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W
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M
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IR
IN
G
 
B5 HUMAN FACTORS 
5.1 Pilot workload evaluation X X X X X X X X 
5.2 Data link sync mode evaluation X X  X X  X X 
5.2.1 Reduction in data link time delay X X  X X  X X 
5.2.2 Backup controller is not prevented from sending 
MITL commands 
X X  X X  X X 
5.3 Qualitatively evaluate pilot workload to maintain 
target in FOV for aimpoint selection against 
jinking/weaving high speed target. 
 U       
5.4 Measure pilot stress in selecting aim point in 
scene filled with target 
      U         
NOTES:  U - one of the unique / primary objectives for this event 
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Figure A-5. Effects of Varying Target Uncertainty – Full Run.  
 38
 Figure A-6. Effects of Varying Target Uncertainty – One Seeker Cycle. 
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 1C (111)
PP Simflight
DL13 AIRCRAFT:  CO-OP CONTROL
a.  RECORDS & VIDEO. ...........…......ON
1.  MASTER MODE…………...…...….A/G
A/A mode can be used, however HOTAS controls 
(except TDC) are unavail for SLMR control.
STORES Page
2.  DL13 ..................……………........BOX
DL13 DISPLAY
3.  WPN...................................….....SLMR
4.  DSPLY...............................…........PRE
5.  COOP......................….............Depress
6.  PP............................…................Select
7.  TTV (Time to Video)…....ENTER (UFC)
8.  CH / ID........…………......Select / Verify
9. ANT...............….....................As Req’d
10. DL PWR...........................................HI
11. DSPLY........................................POST
Prior to or @ MSIM
12. START TTV..............Depress @MSIM
13. TDC.......…......Assign to DL13 Display
@ DL Radiate
14.  Change FOV….......Call “Good Video
Good Control”
Note:  If no HOTAS controls ensure Post 
Display, TDC assigned and A/G selected.
Substitute above Test Parameters for
Steps 15. & 16. in this checklist.
15.  Select WFOV/NFOV …….. As req for
Target ID
16. SLAM ER………..... Control @ 2-3 nm 
when Positive ID
17.  @ End of run, DL13 / A/G…...UNBOX
17a.   RECORDS & VIDEO................OFF
Aircraft Heading ____________
Target RNG/BRG @ Radiate ____________
Target ID Range ____________
Target Rng/Brg @ Overfly ____________
Bedford Workload Scale ____________
MU#2 PP1 ATA
(111) COOP
Seeker On: 15.0 nm
Est. TTV: 03+26
Est. TOT: 05+14
FOV: Wide
Polarity: Hot
Fuzing: Instant
Tracking: ATA
MISSION
Target: Charlie Sam Site
CP1: WP 18 {30 nmi}
CP2: WP 19 {45 nmi}
20,000 MSL 060oT 446 KGS O/B
TEST PARAMETERS:
• Srch Alt:  7766 MSL; 5500 AGL
• Aircraft Dive Angle:  10-15°
• Inside 5.1 nmi to Tgt
• Endgame:  ATA Only
• FOV:  WFOV
• Aim Pt: Small Radar Van
TGT: Charlie Sam Site
ELEV 2259 MSL
7766 MSL
179o T
WP01
WP11
WP10
7766 MSL
240o T
22.2 nmi
7766 MSL
179o T
17.1 nmi
.7 IMN
@ 8 nmi
WP18
WP19
 
 
Figure A-7. Sample ATA Kneeboard Card.1
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Table A-2. ATA Test Objectives for Human Factors.1
 SSV 1.6 
SLAM ER DT-IIID SSV 1.6 
ATA OBJECTIVES MATRIX SS
V
 1
.5
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M
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B5 HUMAN FACTORS               
5.1 Pilot workload evaluation x         x 1 
5.2 Suitability of displays (SCP 26)               
5.2.1 Pilot is confident using ATA cue symbols for target identification x       x x 1 
5.2.2 Symbology x   x x x x 1 
5.2.3 In-video messages x   x x x x 1 
5.3 ATA-MITL mode transitions               
5.3.1 How much time / effort is required to learn how to transition from ATA to MITL, and MITL to ATA              3 
5.3.2 Display clearly shows pilot whether he is in ATA or MITL mode x   x x x x 1 
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VITA 
Keith Matthew Henry was born in Youngstown, OH in 1969.  He lived in Raleigh, 
NC and then moved to Cheshire, CT, where he graduated from High School in 1987.   
 
     He entered the Naval Academy in 1987 where he majored in Electrical Engineering in 
the Class of 1991.  After graduation, he entered flight school in Pensacola, FL.  He 
underwent advanced jet training in Meridian, MS, where he was winged in February of 
1995.  After winging, LT Henry proceeded to Cecil Field for FA-18 training in VFA-106.  
He joined the Rampagers of VFA-83 in April of 1995.  He served as an LSO while 
cruising with CVW-17 onboard the USS Enterprise in the summer of 1996 in support of 
missions over Bosnia and OSW in Iraq.  With the Rampagers, he served as Schedules 
Officer, Aircraft Division Officer and Training Officer.   
 
In July of 1998, LT Henry entered Navy Test Pilot School in Patuxent River, MD.  
After graduating in 1999 with Class 115, LT Henry moved to Point Mugu, CA to join the 
Naval Weapons Test Squadron, Point Mugu.  He served as the Harpoon/SLAM/SLAM 
ER Project Officer overseeing the IOC and Fleet Training of SLAM ER, the Milestone II 
decision on SLAM ER ATA and the developmental testing of Harpoon Block III.   
 
In June of 2001, LCDR Henry received orders to the Dambusters of VFA-195.  
After a brief stop at Naval Safety School, he joined VFA-195 in Atsugi, Japan in 
September of 2001.  He immediately deployed to Diego Garcia and subsequently the 
USS Kitty Hawk in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.  He served as Safety Officer 
and Maintenance Officer in the Dambusters.  Additionally, he served as Operations 
Officer during the Dambusters’ participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  
 
In March of 2004, LCDR Henry reported to Naval Strike Air Warfare Center 
(NSAWC) in Fallon, NV.  He has served as the N5 Sea Trial Branch Head and presently 
is the N5 Land Strike Branch Head as well as an Overall Instructor for Air Wing 
Training. 
 
 Keith has over 2300 hours in 25 different aircraft, including over 350 arrested 
landings and over 1500 hours in the FA-18.  His awards include Individual Air Medal 
with "V", Strike Flight Air Medal (Second), the Navy Commendation Medal (Third), 
Navy Unit Commendation, Meritorious Unit Commendation and the Battle E Award. 
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